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I. Introduction 
Not a single federal arrangement has been successful in demarcating the territorial 
matrix of the federation into separate ethnically defined territorial units. The decade-old 
federal experiment in Ethiopia is no exception to the impractical reality of creating 
ethnically pure sub-national units. Although the internal structure of the federation, by 
and large, follows an ethnic line, ethnic minorities are found in the midst of most, if not 
all, regionally empowered ethnic groups. This has brought to  the  fore  issues  about  the  
majority–minority  tension  at the level of the sub-national units or, as they are called in 
Ethiopia, regions. The status and treatment of those who do not belong to  the  
empowered regional majority has emerged as a thorny issue that has bedevilled the 
federal experiment.1 
The aim of this contribution is to examine whether the federal system adopted in 
Ethiopia responds adequately to the challenges of internal minorities. It, in particular, 
examines whether the federal arrangement provides for appropriate institutional 
solutions to the tensions that exist between regionally empowered groups and their 
internal minorities. Before discussing the Ethiopian case, however, the article, in the 
following section, casts the issue in the context of multi-ethnic federations. By doing so, 
it seeks to show that the problem of internal minorities is not unique to the federal 
arrangement in Ethiopia. 
1. The terms ethnic minorities, intra-substate minorities, internal minorities and minorities within minorities are used interchangeably to
refer to those who do not belong to the regionally empowered group. For the sake of brevity and consistency, this article has opted to
use the term internal minorities.
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II. The plight of internal minorities in multi-ethnic 
Federations2 
Internal minorities are the common feature of multi-ethnic federations. English- 
speakers in Quebec (Canada), Spanish-speakers in Catalonia (Spain) and French- 
speakers in Flanders (Belgium) are some of the prominent examples of internal 
minorities in the literature of multi-ethnic federations.3 The impractical reality of 
creating an ethnically or linguistically homogenous sub-national unit has made the 
accommodation of internal minorities an essential part of the efforts to build a 
successful federation. 
The treatment of internal minorities is one of the tensions that characterises the oldest 
federation in Africa, Nigeria. This is mostly about the treatment of individuals that are 
not regarded as indigenous to the state in which they reside. Internal migrants in 
Nigeria are often subjected to discriminatory policies and laws. The federation has 
experienced tension and even serious communal violence ‘over attempts by indigenes to 
exclude large, but ostensibly non-indigenous, resident communities from economic and 
political opportunities controlled by state and local governments’.4 The multi-ethnic 
federation of Canada has also been grappling with the problem of internal minorities. 
This largely pertains to the treatment of English speakers in the French-speaking 
province of Quebec. The Charter of the French Language in Quebec, which is famously 
known as Bill 101, is a good example that illustrates this situation. Adopted by the Parti 
Québécois government in 1977, Bill 101, following the territorial model of language 
planning, sought to promote the use of French and at the same time restrict the use of 
English. It obliges both immigrants and Canadians moving to Quebec to send their 
children to a French school and mandated the display of commercial signs in French 
only. Although part of this legislation was eventually abrogated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, it vividly illustrates the majority–minority tension that characterises Canada 
and other multi-ethnic federations. 
 
2. This section is partly adopted from a broader work on federalism and internal minorities by Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha. 
3. A. Patten, ‘The Rights of Internal Linguistic Minorities’, in A. Eisenberg and J. Spinner-Halev (eds), Minorities within Minorities: Equality, 
Rights and Diversity, Cambridge University Press (2005), pp. 135–56. 
4. R. T. Suberu, ‘Nigeria’, in L. Moreno and C. Colino (eds), Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries: A Global Dialogue on Federalism, 
vol. 7, McGill-Queen’s University Press (2010), pp. 227–57. 
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Another multi-ethnic federation that is confronted with the problem of internal 
minorities is the linguistically divided Belgium. When the linguistic border was fixed in 
1963 in Belgium, members of the francophone community found themselves 
demarcated into the Flemish-speaking part of the country. In order to accommodate 
these internal minorities, ‘language facilities’ were introduced in Flanders along the 
language border. In a clear exception to the rule of territoriality and with a view to 
protecting internal linguistic minorities, these facilities allow individual inhabitants the 
right to communicate in their own language with a public authority, even if the authority 
is not from the same linguistic group. 
In addition, the local municipality, upon a request from a minimum number of parents, 
has to offer primary education in the language of the minority group. The problem is 
that the Flemish tend to see these facilities as transitional measure while the Walloons 
regard them as permanent component of the institutional organisation that has to 
accommodate the French-speaking minorities.5 In the former Yugoslavia, the territorial 
structure  was  arranged  along  ethnic  lines but failed to completely coincide territorial 
boundaries with patterns of ethnic settlement resulting in disgruntled internal 
minorities. As a result, ‘the break up of Yugoslavia has produced unstable successor 
states with internal minorities, and has led to savage warfare and genocide in the service 
of ethnic cleansing’.6 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the need to take into account the interests and rights 
of internal minorities is particularly important for a multi-ethnic federation. The 
challenges of accommodating internal minorities are manifest in different aspects of 
governance. From the above examples, however, it is clear that the plight of internal 
minorities is often visible in the areas of language policy and education. In states 
whereby each constituent unit is allowed to promote its own language, the vexing 
question has been whether internal minorities have to assimilate to the language of the 
regionally dominant group or should still be allowed to use their own language. 
Irrespective of the nature of the challenges, the point remains that account must be 
taken of whether the adopted federal arrangement prejudices the rights and interests of 
the non-dominant communities within the constituent units. Securing the rights of 
internal minorities that are created by autonomy arrangements is crucial to the long-
term success of any federal arrangement.7 
5. Disagreement  continues  between  the  Walloons  and  the  Flemish  over  the  interpretation  of the language facilities; see K. Deschouwer, 
‘Belgium’, in J. Kincaid and A. G. Tarr (eds), Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in Federal Countries: A Global Dialogue on 
Federalism, vol. 1, McGill-Queen’s University Press (2005), pp. 48–76. 
6. A. C. Cairns, ‘Constitutional Government and the Two Faces of Ethnicity: Federalism Is Not Enough’, in K. Knopf, S. Ostry, R. Simeon 
and K. Swinton (eds), Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets and Governments in a Changing World, University of British Columbia 
Press (1995), p. 27. 
7. Y. Ghai, ‘Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis’, in Y. Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing 
Claims in Multi-ethnic States, Cambridge University Press (2001), pp. 1–28. 
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Two-thirds of the 76 million population belong to three major ethnic groups. This is 
despite the fact that the country is home to no fewer than eighty ethnic groups. The 
Oromo are the largest ethnic group accounting for 34.49 per cent of the population, 
followed by the Amhara (26.89 per cent) and the Somali (6.2 per cent). The next four 
numerically strong ethnic groups are the Tigray (6.1 per cent), Sidama (4.0 per cent), 
Gurage (2.5 per cent) and Wolayta (2.3 per cent).8 With no single ethnic group 
accounting for the majority of the population, Ethiopia, like most other African states, 
can be appropriately described as a country of minorities. 
To be precise, although all ethnic groups can be designated as ethnic minorities at the 
federal level, majority–minority relationships characterise most of the regions. This 
largely has to do with the geographical configuration of the federation. Article 47 
establishes nine regions that are largely delimited along linguistic lines: the state of 
Tigray, the state of Afar, the state of Amhara, the state of Oromia, the state of Somali, 
the state of Benishangul-Gumuz, the state of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples (hereafter SNNPR), the state of the Gambella peoples and the state of the 
Harari people.9 Although none of the regional states is ethnically pure, a particular 
ethnic group constitutes a significant numerical majority in each of the first five regions 
listed above. In fact, each of these regions is also designated after the name of its 
numerically dominant ethnic group.10 Although these five regions are designated as 
belonging to their respective numerically dominant ethnic groups, they are not 
ethnically pure. Internal minorities are scattered throughout the regional majorities, 
giving rise to a majority–minority tension. Neither are the remaining regions immune to 
the challenges of accommodating internal minorities; as is evident from their names, 
they, unlike the other regions, have not been designated as belonging to one specific 
group. With no single ethnic group accounting for the majority of the regional 
population, ethnic groups living in the three regional states can also be regarded as 
internal minorities. 
Some of the internal minorities are indigenous to the area they inhabit. This, for 
example, includes ethnic groups like the Kunama in Tigray as well as the Agew and the 
Oromo, both of which inhabit pockets of the territory of the Amhara regional state. On 
the other hand, many people are also living outside ‘their region’, where they 
consequently constitute an internal minority. These 
8 The 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: FDRE Population Census Commission, Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 
Population and Housing Census (2008). 
9 This is based on article 46 of the constitution, which states that the geographical configuration of the federal state shall be based on ‘the 
basis of settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned’, indicating that ethnicity constitutes not only one of the 
major features of the constitution but also the basis for the internal organisation of the federal state. 
10 An exception to this is the Harari regional state, which is designated after the Harari ethnic group despite the fact that the Harari constitute a 
small numerical minority in the Harar region (i.e., they make up barely 10 per cent of the regional population). Yet, the 2004 Harari 
regional constitution enables the Harari to exercise considerable control over the regional political institutions. The Ethiopian federal 
constitution grants constitutional autonomy, hence the power to enact their own constitutions, to all regions. All regions have effectively 
used this power and adopted their own constitutions. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
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are individuals that belong to the Amhara and other ethnic groups who have historically 
moved south and settled in Oromia and other regional states for different historic or 
economic reasons. This means that at least two types of internal minorities may be 
identified: indigenous and non-indigenous internal minorities. 
The classification of internal minorities into indigenous and non-indigenous finds 
support in both regional constitutions and their political practice. The term indigenous 
is, for instance, explicitly used in the Benishangul-Gumuz constitution of 2002 to refer 
to five ethnic groups: the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo. This is irrespective 
of the fact that many people belonging to other ethnic groups and that have historically 
moved to the region also reside in the region, accounting for almost 50 per cent of the 
regional population. According to the Benishangul-Gumuz constitution, these particular 
ethnic groups fall under the category of non-indigenous groups.  
Other regional constitutions, like the Gambella constitution, use the term ‘founder’ 
nations, conveying the same meaning.11 The differentiation into indigenous and non-
indigenous, founders and others, can be attributed to the ‘territorial approach’ that the 
Ethiopian federation has adopted to the challenges  of ethnic diversity,  which is the 
hallmark of the Ethiopian federation. When establishing the nine regions, an attempt 
was made to achieve an overlap between regional borders and ethnic borders.12 Each 
region was conceived as the home of one or several ethnic groups.13 Hence, internal 
minorities living outside the region that is supposed to be theirs are considered as non-
indigenous. As the next two sections show, having an indigenous or non- indigenous 
status has important implications for the legal position of an internal minority. 
 
IV. The legal protection of indigenous internal minorities 
Indigenous internal minorities can claim a wide range of rights based on federal as well 
as regional constitutions. This is related to the fact that the federal 
11 The constitution of Gambella designates the Nuer, Anuak, Mejenger, Upo and Komo as founders of the regional state. This does not include 
individuals that belong to other ethnic groups and that have historically moved to the region and account for almost 25 per cent of the 
population. 
12 The decision to coincide regional boundaries with ethnic groups can be traced to Proclamation No. 7/1992 of 14 January 1992; a law 
enacted during the transitional period. With the view to implement an ethnic-based decentralisation programme, the law established 
fourteen regions. Furthermore, the law listed more than sixty ethnic groups and linked each one of them to one (or in case of the Oromo to 
two) of the regions. Hence, the law localised the traditional territory of the ethnic groups in one of the fourteen regions. To put it differently, 
all ethnic groups were considered to be indigenous in one of the fourteen regions. This territorial-administrative set-up was transplanted into 
the federal constitution although the number of regions was reduced to nine as five of the regions in the south were merged into one to form 
the SNNPR. 
13 The ethno-territorial emphasis can also be inferred from the constitutional right of all ethnic groups to secede from the federation (article 39 
federal constitution) as well as from the right of all ethnic groups to establish their ‘own’ region within the federation (article 47(2) federal 
constitution). 
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constitution provides for a broad spectrum of rights that are relevant for the protection 
of both individuals that belong to indigenous internal minorities and to the minorities as 
groups. In other words, both individual and group-specific rights are provided for. 
Individual rights that are relevant for the protection of persons that belong to 
indigenous internal minorities include the right to equality and non- discrimination,14 
freedom of movement and freedom to choose one’s residence within the Ethiopian 
territory,15 and the right to vote and to be elected without any discrimination on any 
grounds including based on ethnic identity.16 
On the other hand, article 39 of the constitution provides for important group- specific 
rights, including the right to self-determination. To be precise, four components of the 
right to self-determination can be identified. First, ethnic groups are granted language 
rights and cultural rights. Article 39(2) provides that every ethnic group ‘has the right to 
speak, write and develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its 
own culture; and to preserve its history’. Second, every ethnic group is given the right to 
self-government, which includes an important component of the right to territorial self-
rule. In addition, article 47(2) of the federal constitution grants all ethnic groups – 
except for the six that already have a ‘mother’ region – the right to establish their own 
region.17 Third, every ethnic group has the right to be represented in the regional and 
federal governments. Finally, article 39 grants every ethnic group the right to secede 
from the federation. 
Internal indigenous minorities at the regional level can invoke these rights against the 
regional government. After all, the federal constitution is the supreme law of the land 
that has to be respected and enforced both by federal and regional authorities.18 In fact, 
the universal rights recognised by the federal constitution have been almost fully 
integrated into the regional constitutions. The four-component right to self-
determination is also included in all regional constitutions. Indigenous internal 
minorities can, therefore, claim a wide spectrum of universal and group-specific rights 
based on the federal and their respective regional constitutions. 
 
14 Article 25 federal constitution. 
15 Article 32 federal constitution. 
16 Article 38 federal constitution. 
17 Neither the right to secession nor the right to establish a new regional state has so far been exercised. To date, the rights of the indigenous 
minorities have been exercised within and through the framework of the nine regions established by the federal constitution. 
18 Article 9 federal constitution. 
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Of course, the recognition of rights is not enough. States need to put in place 
mechanisms that can ensure the implementation of constitutionally recognised rights. 
This is especially true with group-specific rights, which, like the individual rights, 
impose negative obligations on the State but also require the regions to take measures 
that are necessary to ensure the realisation of these rights. The regional states have, in 
particular, sought to use the territorial subdivisions of their units to respond to the 
problem of internal minorities. Furthermore, some of the regional constitutions have 
complemented these mechanisms with arrangements that allow for equitable 
representation in the institutions of the regional government. As the ensuing paragraphs 
amply demonstrate, aspects of both self-rule and shared rule, it seems, form part of the 
institutional mechanisms that the regional constitutions provide for in order to 
guarantee the legal protection of indigenous internal minorities. 
 
A. Territorial self-rule for indigenous internal minorities 
Most of the regional governments are comprised of a three-tier local government 
structure, namely Zone, Wereda and Kebele. With the view to accommodating 
indigenous internal minorities, several regional constitutions have amended their 
constitutions  to  provide  for  the  establishment  of  ethnically  defined  Zones, which 
are hierarchically situated just below the regional government.19   The ethnically defined 
Zones are recognised by their respective regional constitutions as  an  autonomous  tier  
of  local  government  with  constitutionally  mandated elected  councils  and  executive  
administrations.   
 
 
19 For example, the SNNPR is home to dozens of ethnic groups. In order to respond to the constitutional requirement of ensuring self-
government for the different ethnic groups, the regional constitution has established ethnically defined Zonal administrations. The Amhara 
state has also established three special Zones (or Nationality Administrations) for the three indigenous minorities (i.e., the Agew Himra, 
Awi and Oromo). Similar administrative entities are provided for the five indigenous minorities in Benishangul-Gumuz. See article 74 
Benishangul-Gumuz constitution and Benishangul-Gumuz regional Proclamation No. 73/2008, Lissane Hig Gazeta, 1 November 2008. The 
Gambella constitution also provides for the establishment of a Nationality Zone for the three indigenous minorities of Anuak, Nuer and 
Mejenger. 
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Several  regional  states  have also established Special Weredas in order to accommodate 
indigenous internal minorities that, owing to their population size, cannot have their 
own Zone within a regional state.20 In the case of some regional states, even Kebele, the 
lowest local government unit, is used to address the claims of indigenous internal 
minorities that are too small in number to have their own Zonal or Wereda 
administrations.21 Simply put, the basic mechanism that the regional states use to 
implement the rights of indigenous internal minorities is the creation of a separate 
territorial entity in a form of local government in which the indigenous internal 
minorities are in a majority.22  Functioning as autonomous entities, these ethnically 
defined local governments (i.e., Zones, Weredas and, in some cases, including Kebele) 
provide indigenous internal minorities with the territorial space that is necessary to 
manage their own affairs. They enable the indigenous internal minorities to exercise 
some measure of self-rule, the degree of which is, of course, determined by the 
competencies of the particular local government concerned. For instance, Weredas have 
the power to approve plans of socio-economic development and the corresponding own 
budget. The Council of the Wereda has also the power to appoint and exercise control 
over the Wereda executive body. Furthermore, the ethnically defined Zones/Special 
Weredas allow indigenous internal minorities to protect and promote their language as 
their respective regional constitutions allow them to choose their own working language. 
 
20 The region with the largest number of Special Weredas is the SNNPR, which has four Special Weredas. The Tigray regional constitution 
does not provide for a separate territorial entity for the indigenous Irob and Kunama minorities, but in practice a separate Wereda has been 
established for the Irob. Article 43(2) of the Afar constitution stipulates that the Argoba have a right to a separate Wereda and such a 
Wereda has effectively been established in the region. 
21 In Gambella, for example, the establishment of a Nationality Zone or Special Wereda is not provided for the numerically very small Upo 
and Komo minorities. However, according to article 47(3) of the Gambella constitution, they, as minority nationalities, have the right to 
establish their own Kebele. Similarly, the Kunama in Tigray have their own Kebele. 
22 As the foregoing would suggest, the arrangements designed for the fulfilment of the right to self- determination are similar in all regions and 
are reflective of the ethnic-territorial approach that constitutes the central characteristic of Ethiopia’s federal experiment. 
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B. Representation of indigenous internal minorities in the regional 
government 
The federal constitution requires the ‘equitable representation’ of the different ethnic  
groups  in  regional  governments.23  Regional  governments  are  obliged to ensure that 
the faces of their institutions reflect the ethnic plurality that characterises their society. 
This, first, applies to regional states that are, more or less, ethnically homogenous but 
still have some minorities in their midst. This refers to, for example, the representation 
of the Kunama and Irob ethnic communities in Tigray as well as the Agew Awi and the 
Oromo in Amhara. Second, and more importantly, it applies to the ethnically 
heterogeneous regional states like Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and SNNPR. In short, 
it applies to all indigenous internal minorities. Furthermore, the equitable 
representation of the different ethnic communities is not merely limited to the 
executive. As the obligation of ensuring equitable representation is mentioned in 
relation to state and federal governments in general, state governments are obliged to 
ensure equitable representation in the legislative and judicial arms of state governments 
as well. The constitutional obligation of equitable representation reflects the 
constitutional commitment to accommodate intra-regional diversity. By ensuring 
representation of the different ethnic groups that inhabit the regions, it signals the 
message that each region belongs to all who live in it. Yet, the realisation of this 
constitutional mandate depends on the regional constitutions that should give effect to 
it. The question is then whether regional constitutions and laws have put in place 
mechanisms that ensure the implementation of this constitutional mandate. 
In this regard, the plurality electoral system used in all regions goes a long way in 
ensuring the representation of most indigenous internal minorities in the regional 
parliaments. In case indigenous internal minorities are too small to control an electoral 
constituency, they are treated as minority nationalities and peoples.24 Many of the 
regional constitutions grant these minorities a special  
 
 
23 Article 39(3) federal constitution. This constitutional mandate applies to the federal government as well. 
24 Article 2(6) Proclamation No. 7/1992, Negarit Gazeta, 14 January 1992 and article 20(a)–(d) Electoral Law of Ethiopia Amendment 
Proclamation No. 532/2007, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 25 June 2007. 
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representation in the form of a quota in their respective regional parliament.25 With 
regard to the executive, the regional constitutions, with the exception of one regional 
constitution (i.e., the constitution of Harar), do not provide an explicit guarantee of 
ethnic representation. In practice, however, the composition of almost all regional 
governments reflects a fair representation of their respective indigenous internal 
minorities.26 The interest of indigenous internal minorities is also taken into account in 
the composition of the regional judiciary. Ethnic Zones are given the right to advise the 
regional parliament on the appointment of judges. Furthermore, indigenous internal 
minorities have a constitutionally guaranteed representation in the regional institutions 
that are responsible for interpreting their respective constitutions.27 The regional bodies 
that are responsible for interpreting their respective constitutions include a 
representative either from each Wereda or at least from each ethnically defined Zone 
and Special Wereda.28 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Ethiopian constitutional framework provides 
for a number of mechanisms to protect the interests of indigenous internal 
minorities. In line with the ethno-territorial approach that underlies the federal 
arrangement, the major mechanism for the protection of indigenous internal minorities 
involves the creation of separate ethnic-based territorial administrations within which 
the indigenous internal minorities concerned can exercise self-government and other 
minority rights. This is complemented by a constitutional instruction that each regional 
government must ensure the equitable representation of the different ethnic 
communities. As the following sections 
 
25 Article 45(3) Amhara constitution; article 48(2) Benishangul-Gumuz constitution; article 50(2) Gambella constitution; article 50(2) 
Southern constitution. 
26 C. Van der Beken, Unity in Diversity – Federalism as a Mechanism to Accommodate Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia, Lit 
Verlag (2012), p. 289. 
27 The Ethiopian Constitution is unique in that the power to interpret the constitution and to rule on issues of constitutionality is not left to the 
courts but rather to a political body. Almost all regional constitutions, with the exception of the constitution of the Southern region (SNNPR), 
emulate this model and provide for the establishment of a specific Constitutional Interpretation Commission. 
28 For example, the Afar constitution stipulates that the Constitutional Interpretation Commission shall be composed of representatives 
from each Wereda Council in the region (article 70(1) Afar constitution). The territorial organisation of the region, which establishes a 
specific Wereda for the Argoba, the only indigenous internal minority in the region, ensures the representation of the latter in the 
Commission. Article 68(1) of the Tigray constitution provides that members of the Commission shall include representatives from 
each Wereda Council (thus including an Irob representative) as well as the representatives of the region in the House of the Federation 
(which includes one Irob and one Kunama representative). On the other hand, the constitutions of the Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz 
and Gambella regions ensure the representation of the indigenous minorities in the Commission by including representatives from the 
ethnically defined Zones, alternatively known as Nationality Administrations, administrative units that, as indicated earlier, are 
established for their respective indigenous internal minorities. Article 70(1) of the Amhara constitution states that the members of the 
Constitutional Interpretation Commission are to be drawn from each and every Nationality and Wereda Council. Article 71(1) of the 
Benishangul-Gumuz constitution guarantees an equal representation of all indigenous minorities in the Constitutional Interpretation 
Commission. More specifically, it says that each indigenous nationality shall have four representatives. These four representatives shall be 
elected by the Councils of their territorial-administrative entities: the Council of the Administration of Nationalities. The Constitutional 
Interpretation Commission in the Gambella region is similarly composed of representatives of each (of the three) Councils of Nationality 
Zone. 
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will reveal, however, non-indigenous minorities do not enjoy the same level of 
protection. The legal status of non-indigenous internal minorities is the focus of the next 
section. 
V. The legal protection of non-indigenous internal minorities 
As indicated earlier, although the majority of non-indigenous internal minorities belong 
to the Amhara ethnic group, individuals that belong to other groups, who nevertheless 
speak Amharic, are also widely scattered throughout the country. They are usually found 
in large number in major urban areas. Owing to their settlement pattern, territorial self-
rule is not feasible for these minorities. 
The settlement pattern of non-indigenous internal minorities suggests that they must 
seek protection within a non-territorial framework. One such mechanism that is often 
used to protect minorities relates to a constitutionally entrenched list of individual 
rights, commonly known as a bill of rights. Individual rights, as indicated earlier, form a 
major part of both the federal and regional constitutions. This is clearly stated from the 
outset in the preamble to the constitution, which emphasises the ‘full respect of 
individual and people’s fundamental freedoms and rights’. It also declares the need to 
‘live together on the basis of equality and without any sexual, religious or cultural 
discrimination’. As mentioned earlier, the constitution also provides for a vast array of 
universal individual rights. Importantly, article 25 of the constitution declares the right 
to equality and prohibits discrimination on grounds of, among other things, race, 
nation, nationality, or other social origin, language, religion or other status. Of course, 
individuals that belong to non-indigenous internal minorities can – as any other citizen 
– claim these individual rights. For instance, citizens with an Amhara identity cannot be 
denied the right to move to the Oromia region29  and neither can they be denied the 
right to vote and to be elected to regional parliament. In general, members of non-
indigenous internal minorities have the right not to be discriminated against by the 
regional government.30  This means that effective protection of individual rights would 
go a long way in protecting and promoting the rights and interest of persons that belong 
to non-indigenous internal minorities. The practice does not, however, reflect the equal 
status that the constitution bestows on individual and collective rights. As argued 
elsewhere, the major challenge  in  terms  of  accommodating  non-indigenous  internal  
minorities  is attributable to a political practice that gives more weight to collective 
rights and frustrates claims based on individual rights. For example, there are cases 
where the language issue has often been used to block non-indigenous internal 
minorities from exercising their individual rights to participate in the political 
institutions of the regional states. More specifically, in some regions, individuals that do 
not speak the working language of the region are barred from contesting elections. As 
29 Article 32 federal constitution and Oromia constitution.  
30 Article 25 federal constitution and Oromia constitution. 
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a result, the political participation of non-indigenous internal minorities in state 
administration has been largely curtailed. This contradicts article 38 of the federal 
constitution, which declares the right of every Ethiopian national to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, including to vote and to be elected at periodic elections, 
without any discrimination based on nation, nationality, language, religion or other 
status. In fact, the right of individuals that belong to non-indigenous internal minorities 
to stand for election was at the centre of a case that was brought before the House of 
Federation, the second chamber of the Ethiopian parliament that has the unique 
responsibility of interpreting the constitution and ruling on the constitutionality of laws. 
In that case, three Amharic-speaking individuals belonging to non-indigenous internal 
minorities wanted to stand for the 2000 state legislature election in Benishangul-
Gumuz regional state.31 A decision of the National Electoral Board (NEB) denied the 
individuals the right to stand for election on the ground that they could not 
communicate in any of the four indigenous languages spoken in the region. The decision 
of the NEB was later reversed by the House of Federation. Although the decision of the 
House affirmed the right of the individuals to contest the election, it has not confirmed 
the right of individuals to stand for an election irrespective of their linguistic ability. The 
House rejected the decision of the NEB on the basis that the individuals can speak the 
working language of the region, which happens to be Amharic, and do not necessarily 
have to speak the languages of any of the indigenous groups. It held, however, that the 
electoral law that makes the right to stand for an election dependent on the ability to 
speak the working language of the region is constitutional. This represents a legal 
endorsement of the political practice that denies individuals that belong to non-
indigenous internal minorities the right to exercise their political rights in regions that 
do not use Amharic as their working language, thereby relegating them to second-class 
citizens. Considering the frustration of claims based on individual rights, one wonders 
whether non-indigenous internal minorities can rely on group-specific rights to protect 
the rights and interests of their members. A brief survey of the regional constitutions 
would reveal that the provisions of the multi-faceted group-specific right of self-
determination are either expressly or implicitly limited to indigenous internal 
minorities. Article 8 of the 2001 Oromia constitution grants sovereign power exclusively 
to the ‘people of the Oromo Nation’ and the constitution, under article 39, reserves the 
right to self-determination to the ‘people of the Oromo nation’. This suggests that the 
right to exercise self-determination, as provided by the regional constitution, is the 
preserve of the ‘Oromo people’, excluding a large number of non-indigenous minorities 
from the constitutional promise of the right to self-determination. Similar provisions are 
included in articles 9(1) and 39 of the 2002 Somali constitution. Furthermore, most of 
the regional 
31 Benishangul-Gumuz is home to four major indigenous ethnic groups. It is also inhabited by a very large group of Amhara and other 
Amharic-speaking individuals from other ethnic groups. The working language of the region is Amharic. 
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constitutions and their laws have limited the establishment of ethnically defined 
Zones and Special Weredas to indigenous internal minorities.32 As indicated earlier, 
the creation of such separate sub-regional territorial units in which the minority 
concerned is in a majority is the mechanism that is used to realise the right to self-
determination of indigenous internal minorities. Insofar as the right of 
representation in regional government institutions is concerned, no specific 
mechanisms are  provided  either.  Non-indigenous internal minorities  are  not 
represented in the regional parliaments. Of course, as any Ethiopian citizen, they 
have the right to vote and to be elected into regional parliaments. The right to be 
elected is, however, dependent on the candidate knowing the regional working 
language,33 which, as indicated earlier, has proved to be an obstacle for the election 
of individuals belonging to non-indigenous internal minorities. Neither can the non-
indigenous internal minorities claim a representation in the regional institutions 
that are responsible for constitutional control. 
 
 
Vi. Improving the legal status of non-indigenous internal minorities 
Although non-indigenous internal minorities might be entitled to claim the minority 
rights provided by article 39 of the federal constitution, the foregoing discussion has 
demonstrated that no constitutional mechanisms have been designed to guarantee 
the enforcement of these rights. Based on these observations, we will now consider a 
number of constitutional/administrative arrangements that can be used to address 
the concerns of individuals belonging to non-indigenous internal minorities. The 
next section commences the discussion by examining the option of non-territorial 
autonomy. 
 
A. Granting non-territorial autonomy34 
The mechanism of non-territorial autonomy deviates radically from the ethno-
territorial approach that characterises the Ethiopian federal system. Non-territorial 
autonomy entails the establishment of legislative and executive councils that are not 
linked to a particular territory. The authority of these institutions will be limited to 
the members of the concerned ethnic group but will extend to all 
 
32 The  Amhara,  Gambella  and  Benishangul-Gumuz  constitutions  as  well  as  laws  limit  the establishment of a Nationality 
Administration/Zone to the indigenous minorities. Although the constitution of SNNPR  does  not  explicitly  exclude  non-
indigenous  minorities  from the establishment of Zones/Special Weredas (article 45(2) Southern constitution), no ethnic 
Zones/Special Weredas were created to date for non-indigenous minorities. Of course, it must be added that the geographical settlement 
of most non-indigenous internal minorities, which are ethnically dispersed, means the territorial approach is not an option that is always 
available. 
33 Article 45(1)(b) Electoral Law of Ethiopia Amendment Proclamation No. 532/2007, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 25 June 2007. 
34 A detailed discussion on the application of non-territorial autonomy in Ethiopia can be found in C.  Van  der  Beken,  ‘Minority  Protection  
in  Ethiopia – Unraveling  and  Improving  Ethnic Federalism’, Recht in Afrika (2010): 243–73. 
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members of the group, irrespective of where they live in Ethiopia.35  Autonomy 
is therefore linked not to a territorial administration but to the ethnic group 
concerned.36 
 
The suggestion here is to complement territorial institutions with non- territorial 
institutions. Powers could be allocated between both territorial and non-territorial 
institutions. This would mean that identity related matters, such as language,  
culture  and  education,  which  are  now  under  the  jurisdictions of territorial 
institutions (i.e., regions/Nationality Administrations/ethnic Zones/ Special 
Weredas) can be exercised by non-territorial institutions in which only members of 
the particular non-indigenous internal minority are represented. Powers that are 
territorial because of their very nature – such as trade, police, land policy, 
agriculture and infrastructure – would continue to be under the authority of the 
territorial institutions. Nevertheless, the territorial institutions would continue to 
have the power to determine their working language. This is obviously because the 
best protection for a language remains its use by public authorities acting for and on 
behalf of a territorial unit.37 
 
Although non-territorial autonomy  stands in sharp  contrast to the  ethno- 
territorial solution that represents the hallmark of the Ethiopian federation, the 
concept and application of non-territorial autonomy are not completely alien to 
Ethiopian federalism. A good example of non-territorial autonomy (but probably for 
a different purpose) comes from the constitution of one of the nine regions, namely 
the Harar regional constitution of 2004. Like all regions, the Harar region has a 
regional parliament. But unlike other regions, the parliament in Harar is 
 
 
35 In the 1990s, different countries employed the concept of non-territorial autonomy in their institutional organisations (e.g., in Estonia, 
Latvia, Slovenia and Russia). Currently, the concept of non-territorial autonomy is evident in the division of the federation of Belgium into 
communities and regions. The Constitution recognises three communities: Flemish, French and German. The three regions include the 
largely Dutch-speaking Flemish, the French-speaking Walloon and Brussels. The functions and responsibilities of the communities are 
related to the protection of the linguistic identity of their respective communities. As a result, the communities are responsible for education, 
cultural issues, person-related affairs (like health, social welfare and the like), and the use of language for the purposes of administration, 
education and social relations. It must be noted that there is no complete territorial overlap between the communities and the regions. 
Hence, the laws of the Walloon region have no legal force in the bilingual region of Brussels. On the other hand, the decrees of the Flemish 
and French community apply in the Dutch- and French- speaking regions respectively. More importantly for our purpose, the laws of the 
communities, it must be noted, apply on the institutions established in the bilingual region of Brussels which, on account of their activities, 
must be considered as belonging exclusively to one community or the other. In practice, this means that the Dutch speakers in Brussels 
resort to the authority of the Flemish community, just like the inhabitants of the Flemish region. The same goes for the French- speaking 
residents of Brussels. The role of the communities in Brussels forms a clear application of the concept of non-territorial autonomy. For 
more, see Van der Beken, Unity in Diversity, supra note 26. 
36 J. McGarry, ‘Federal Political Systems and the Accommodation of National Minorities’, in A. L. Griffiths and K. Nerenberg (eds), 
Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002, McGill-Queen’s University Press (2002), p. 425. 
37 J. McGarry and M. Moore, ‘Karl Renner, Power Sharing and Non-territorial Autonomy’, in E. Nimni (ed.), National Cultural Autonomy 
and its Contemporary Critics, Routledge (2005), p. 84. 
 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
15 
 
composed of two houses.38  One of these houses is the Harari National Council, a second 
chamber of the regional parliament. The Council is exclusively composed of Harari 
representatives that are elected not only by Harari living in the region but also by those 
living in other parts of Ethiopia.39 The Council is thus the representative institution of 
all Harari living in Ethiopia, making it a non-territorial institution. The powers of the 
Council are limited to issues that are directly related to the protection of the identity of 
ethnic Harari in areas of language, culture and history.40 
Another non-territorial autonomy arrangement has recently been introduced in the 
Benishangul-Gumuz region. As mentioned earlier, the regional constitution provides for 
the establishment of the Nationality Administration (alternatively known as Zone), an 
ethnic-based territorial administrative entity that, as indicated earlier, is hierarchically 
situated just below the regional level. Based on this, a law enacted by the regional 
parliament has established five Nationality Administrations, one for each of the 
indigenous internal minorities.41 Notably, the Proclamation does not limit the powers of 
these administrations to their respective territories. For certain issues, the 
administrations will have extra- territorial powers, albeit within the boundaries of the 
region. Article 3(4) of the Proclamation stipulates that the Nationality Administration ‘is 
established bounderless regarding the protection and preservation of the rights and 
privileges of nationality cases ... ’. Nationality cases, according to the Proclamation, are 
cases related to language and history. The Nationality Administration will thus be 
competent to protect the language and cultural rights of members of the ethnic group on 
whose behalf it is established, irrespective of the fact that the members live outside their 
zone or traditional homelands. Such a system, obviously, offers a mechanism to protect 
the language and cultural rights of indigenous internal minorities who live outside the 
boundaries of their own sub-regional unit. 
To conclude, granting the option of non-territorial autonomy to all ethnic groups  in  
Ethiopia  would  provide  non-indigenous  internal  minorities  with a mechanism to  
protect  and  promote  their  language  and  culture;  however, the exercise of non-
territorial autonomy within a region or sub-regional administration must be dependent 
on the community exceeding a certain numerical threshold. It must also be noted that 
territorial and non-territorial approaches to ethnic diversity are not mutually exclusive. 
B. Shared rule at the regional level 
Although the application of non-territorial autonomy would contribute to a better 
protection of non-indigenous internal minorities, the position of the latter, insofar as 
territorial issues are concerned, will still be affected by the decisions of 
38 Article 51(1) Harar constitution. 
39 Article 50(2) Harar constitution. 
40 Article 59(1)&(2) Harar constitution. 
41 Benishangul-Gumuz regional Proclamation No. 73/2008, Lissane Hig Gazeta, 1 November 2008. 
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the territorial institutions that represent the regional government. Furthermore, simply 
granting non-territorial autonomy to non-indigenous internal minorities without 
measures that would bring the communities into the regional decision- making process 
might alienate them from the regional or sub-regional majority and thus undermine 
inter-ethnic integration, which is a necessary condition for the successful 
accommodation of ethnic diversity in any federation including Ethiopia.42 In order to 
protect the interests of non-indigenous internal minorities against majority decisions as 
well  as  to  promote  inter-ethnic  cooperation and integration, mechanisms of power 
sharing  at  regional  and  sub-regional level must therefore be developed. Such 
mechanisms could take the form of representation of non-indigenous internal 
minorities in regional and sub-regional parliaments/councils and institutions 
responsible for constitutional interpretation. This guaranteed  representation  can  be  
further  complemented  with  the  right of non-indigenous internal minorities to veto 
decisions that impact upon their fundamental interests. Here also, the workability of the 
system necessitates numerical thresholds. A viable option could be to link the right to 
guaranteed representation with the right to exercise non-territorial autonomy. 
 
C. Establishing multi-ethnic city administrations 
As indicated in the preceding sections, the use of ethnicity to organise the Ethiopian 
federation has not resulted in the creation of ethnically homogenous territories, be it at 
the regional or sub-regional level. In the ethnically defined regions, there are ethnic 
minorities that are politically and, in most cases, numerically dominated by the nominal 
ethnic groups. However, this observation does not necessarily apply to most cities that 
are located in these ethnically defined regions. Ethiopian cities are particularly multi-
ethnic and often the nominal or indigenous ethnic group(s) does not account for the 
majority of the town’s population.43 Despite this fact, the nominal ethnic groups are 
often politically dominant. Individuals that do not belong to the regionally empowered 
group or those that do not speak the regional working language are largely excluded 
from political participation and representation. More specifically, they cannot stand for 
election or run for regional councils. This has been the cause of grievances among the 
majority of individuals that account for the numerically significant part, if not the 
majority, of the population in these ethnically mosaic cities. Very recently, however, the 
regional parliaments, taking this fact into account, have enacted city proclamations, 
giving a specific status and some level of autonomy to cities across the country. 
42 R. Baubock, Multinational Federalism: Territorial or Cultural Autonomy?, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International 
Migration and Ethnic Relations, November 2001, available at http://dspace.mah.se:8080/bitstream/2043/690/1/Workingpaper201.pdf 
(accessed 4 February 2011). 
43 For the ethnic composition of the cities in the Oromia and Southern regions see: Central Statistical Authority, The 1994 Population and 
Housing Census of Ethiopia Results at Country Level Volume II Analytical Report – Results for Oromia Region – Results for Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region, CSA (1995). Data from the latest Population and Housing Census of 2007 confirm this trend. 
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The question is whether these proclamations address the concerns of the urbanites that 
do not belong to the regionally empowered group. 
In 2003, the Oromia regional parliament enacted Proclamation No. 65/2003, which was 
later revised by Proclamation No. 116/2006 of July 2006.44 These proclamations grant 
cities an important degree of autonomy. According to these proclamations, cities are 
administered based on the council–mayor system, in which the city council is vested 
with the final authority on urban issues while the highest executive power rests with the 
mayor and the mayoral committee.45 Members of the council are directly elected by the 
residents of the city.46 Cities, according to the proclamation, are entitled to adopt and 
execute economic and social development plans, adopt the budget of the city, administer 
urban land, and enter into contract and cooperation agreements with different 
stakeholders, including the regional government, the private sector, mass organisations 
and other cities.47 A similar city proclamation has been enacted by the SNNPR regional 
parliament.48 
The creation of autonomous city administrations offers non-indigenous internal 
minorities that are a numerical minority at the regional level but a numerical majority in 
the city an important opportunity for political participation and representation. In the 
Southern region, for instance, the autonomous city administration is  particularly  
important as it  offers  an  opportunity for  self- administration to non-indigenous 
internal minorities that, in most of the towns, account for the majority of the 
population. For instance, the Sidama ethnic group make up a clear majority in the 
Sidama Zone; however, in towns located in the Sidama Zone, such as Hawassa and 
Yirgalem, the Sidama constitute a numerical minority while the non-indigenous internal 
minorities account for the majority of the cities’ population.49 This means the 
application of the City proclamation offers individuals that do not belong to the Sidama 
ethnic group an important opportunity for political representation and significant 
participation in the city administration. Two important points must, however, be noted. 
First, the city councils, in some cases, are made directly accountable to  the  regional  
government.50   
44 Proclamation No. 116/2006, Megeleta Oromia, 12 July 2006. 
45 Article 11 Oromia Proclamation No. 65/2003. 
46 Article 13(1) Oromia Proclamation No. 65/2003. A similar city proclamation in the SNNPR states that the mayor is elected by and from 
among the members of the City Council (article 16(1)(a) Southern Proclamation No. 51/2002). For more see Proclamation No. 51/2002 of 
August 2002. 
47 Article 8 Oromia Proclamation No. 65/2003. 
48 Proclamation No. 51/2002 of August 2002. 
49 Central Statistical Authority, The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia – Results for Southern Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples’ Region, supra note 43. 
50 See article 16 Oromia Proclamation No. 65/2003. 
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Second, some of the initial steps taken to grant some level of autonomy to the city 
administrations have been reversed. In the case of Oromia, for example, although 
Proclamation No. 65/2003 initially provided that the mayor was elected by the city 
council,51 this was later amended by article 6 of Proclamation No. 116/2006, which 
leaves the appointment of the mayor of big cities to the discretion of the regional 
president. Yet, as opposed to the cities in Oromia, the mayors of the Southern cities, 
according to the Southern proclamation, are still elected by and from among the 
members of the city council.52 
It is important to note that despite the participation and representation opportunities 
that these city administrations provide to individuals belonging to non-indigenous 
internal minorities, they do not go without providing protection to indigenous ethnic 
groups. In fact, according to most of these proclamations, ethnic groups that are 
indigenous to a particular city enjoy a specific legal protection. In Oromia, the city 
proclamation states that where the Oromo constitute a minority in a given city, the 
regional executive council may reserve up to 30 per cent of the city council seats to the 
Oromo.53 A similar provision – guaranteeing 30 per cent of the city council seats to the 
indigenous ethnic group – is included in the SNNPR city proclamation.54 A legislative 
amendment in Oromia has even further strengthened the position of the indigenous 
Oromo in the cities. It has done so not only by making, as indicated earlier, the 
appointment of the mayors of the largest cities the discretion of the regional president, 
but also by increasing the percentage of council seats reserved to members of the 
indigenous ethnic group (namely the Oromo) from 30 per cent to 50 per cent. 
 
The  autonomous  or  rather  semi-autonomous  city  administrations  allow individuals 
that belong to non-indigenous internal minorities to manage their own affairs without 
seriously undermining the rights of the indigenous ethnic groups. It is, however, obvious 
that some level of reluctance is evident on the part of the regional governments in 
offering autonomy to city administrations and thereby guaranteeing non-indigenous 
minorities full control over their own affairs. This is evident in the fact that the city 
council, in some cases, is made directly accountable to the regional government. The 
appointment of mayors by regional administrations is another indication. This upward 
accountability betrays an image of regional governments that are wary of their 
respective non-indigenous internal minorities; regional governments that are not yet 
fully committed to ensuring adequate protection to non-indigenous internal minorities. 
In any event, these measures that somehow are providing for semi-autonomous city 
administrations represent a move in the right direction. 
51 Article 14(2)(g) Oromia Proclamation No. 65/2003. 
52 Article 16(1)(a) Southern Proclamation No. 51/2002. 
53 Article 13(3) of Proclamation No. 65/2003. 
54    Article 15(1)(a) of Proclamation No. 51/2002 of the SNNPR. 
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VII. Conclusion 
An effective response to the plight of internal minorities requires regional states to come 
to terms with their ethnic diversities and fully accept that they are sharing with the 
federal state the same challenges of accommodating ethnic diversities but only at a 
regional level. The Ethiopian institutional response to the anxieties of indigenous 
internal minorities, which involves both territorial self-rule and representation in 
regional institutions, is in line with this normative position. At the centre of this 
institutional response is the creation of separate 
ethnic-based territorial administrations within which the indigenous internal minorities 
can exercise self-government and other minority rights. Evidently, this constitutional 
option is not usually available for non-indigenous internal minorities that are often 
geographically dispersed. Some of the mechanisms to accommodate non-indigenous 
minorities must thus be sought within the territorial administration in which these 
minorities find themselves. Judicially enforceable universal individual rights represent 
one such response. In this regard, although the constitutional commitment to the 
observance of full respect to individual and collective rights is an important mechanism 
that can be used to protect individuals belonging to these particular groups, the practice, 
it is observed, is not encouraging. The disenfranchisement of non-indigenous 
minorities, which has  relegated  them  to  ‘secondary  citizens’  of  the  regions,  is  
testimony  to a constitutional practice that has failed to give effect to this constitutional 
commitment. Furthermore, the lack of protection in the form of non-territorial 
autonomy means that non-indigenous internal minorities, who are often ‘too dispersed 
or few in numbers’ to exercise territorial autonomy, are denied a say in matters that are 
relevant to them. It is clear, therefore, that comprehensive minority protection in 
Ethiopia requires the design of complementary constitutional and legal mechanisms 
through which non-indigenous internal minorities can exercise some measure of control 
over matters that are relevant to them. 
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